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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation consists of a set of four sole-authored, reviewed and published papers 
which develop the theme that company accounting policies, particularly those relating 
to asset valuation, depreciation and dividend policy, developed in response to a change 
in the general perception of the nature of the property rights of the original owners. 
The original owners of commercial and industrial concerns in the early nineteenth 
century were the partners. After incorporation they and others became the 
shareholders of the company. 
The origin of commercial and industrial companies as partnerships influenced the 
British government and legal thinking for nearly a century from 1856 to 1945, the date 
of the Cohen Committee. It was the age of laissez-faire and has been much discussed: 
Parliament was less keen to intervene in connection with the generality of companies, 
where the view expressed in 1856 by Robert Lowe, then President of the Board of 
Trade, that `having given [companies] a pattern the State leaves then to manage their 
own affairs ... (quoted in Hein, 1978, p. 149) provided a rationalization of the 
widespread belief that it was no business of the state to interfere in what were seen as 
private contracts between shareholders (Sugarman and-Rubin, 1984, p. 12). Moreover, 
a laissez-faire approach on the part of the courts, where `formalist' views were at their 
height (Atiyah, 1979, pp. 388-97), seems also to have affected the attitude to accounts 
on the part of the courts. This may be observed in the series of `dividend' cases in the 
nineteenth century (French, 1977) where judges on the whole were loath to go beyond 
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the companies' Articles of Association and the latter of the Companies' Acts (unless 
they could adduce fraudulent or improper behaviour on the part of directors) in 
assessing matters of valuation, income measurement and profit determination. 
(Napier and Noke, 1992, p. 38, emphasis added). 
These issues `matters of valuation, income measurement and profit determination' 
form the basis for much of this dissertation. There is one further paper extending the 
work of Jefferys (1938) and Cottrell (1980) on the format of share issues from 1914 
(Pitts 2000). 
Much of the material in this dissertation is based on primary data collected from the 
London Stock Exchange Archive and coal company archives (including integrated 
coal, iron and steel companies) for the period 1860-1914 (see Chapter 3 for sources of 
data). The topics considered are those of corporate finance: the valuation of assets 
(Pitts 1998a, Pitts 2001) and dividend policy (Pitts 1998b). Pitts 1998a and 2001 are 
case histories and relate respectively to a specific company and an individual, while 
Pitts 1998b relates to the coal and iron industry generally. The only paper which 
considers periods after 1914, and is not sector-specific, is Pitts 2000 which deals with 
the development of low nominal value shares with high share premiums after 1920. 
Examples of early share premiums and their treatment in accounts are, however, taken 
from the coal companies. 
Although the primary data is taken from the archives of coal producing companies, the 
conclusions of the papers in the dissertation apply across a wide range of industries. 
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Many of the biggest coal producers (Bolckow Vaughan, Dowlais/GKN, Powell 
Duffryn, John Brown, Wigan) were vertically integrated with the allied sectors of iron, 
steel, engineering, shipbuilding and ordnance, so these sectors shared the same 
evolution. Moreover, there was a common legal, financial and economic background 
to all British sectors: speaking of a wide variety of trades at the end of the nineteenth 
century 
`even the very large mergers that took place in branches of the textile industry 
and in brewing, iron and steel, cement, wallpaper and tobacco at the close of the 
nineteenth century often failed greatly to weaken the hold of the founding 
families, so high a proportion of the issued share capital was retained by the 
vendors' (Payne, 1984 p. 173) 
and there was still a substantial degree of family or founders' control in the twentieth 
century (ibid. ). Other owners were drawn from the same groups: the coal and iron 
companies were located in the provinces like most British industrial and commercial 
concerns, and: 
`the vast majority of provincial public limiteds were floated locally, .... A 
frequent procedure was to place securities privately among the former partners, 
the directors (if the firm was already a limited company) and wealthy friends 
and contacts' (Edelstein 1971 p. 89). 
The development of accounting and valuation techniques discussed in the papers 
which follow is, therefore, not confined to the British coal industry, important as it 
was: coal was the chief world energy source during the Industrial Revolution and 
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after (well beyond 1914) for manufacture, transport (rail, ships) and domestic heating. 
In Britain it was a boom industry after 1860; U. K. coal-mining employment grew from 
300,000 to over 1 million in 1914 (Church 1986 p. 189). Production also more than 
trebled in the same 50 year period: from 85 million tons a year in 1860-4 to 270 
million tons a year in 1910-1914 (Mathias 1983, p. 449). There were a large number 
of coal enterprises ranging from the largest companies to very small family concerns, 
but size did not seem to affect the accounting methods approved and adopted by 
directors of these companies. 
British accounting development in the century from 1864 to 1950 was a crucial period 
for modern company accounting practice world-wide. Current accounting practices of 
the former British Empire and the United States of America were derived from the 
British example and even Japan `built the foundation of modern accounting practice 
by learning from the Anglo-American experience' after 1868 (Tsumori, 1995 p. 71). 
The only exceptions among industrialised nations are those of mainland Europe, 
whose accounting tradition is based on Napoleon's Code de Commerce of 1807. 
The purpose of the collection of published papers presented in this dissertation is to 
investigate some of the important changes in British accounting law and practice and 
the events that led up to them, with the aim of rationalising and putting these 
developments in context in a general economic and legal framework. 
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1.2 History: from Partnerships to Joint Stock Companies 
Companies, as such, did exist before the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844: there are 
estimated to have been 1000 or so of them, mainly in railways (108), gas and water 
(224), insurance (172), banking (48) and shipping (46), each with its individual Act of 
Parliament or Royal Charter (Edwards, 1989 p. 104) and their accounts were closely 
regulated (see section 2.3). All other businesses were run by sole traders or 
partnerships and their accounts followed the well established principles of partnership 
accounting. A major change was brought about by the Limited Liability and Joint 
Stock Companies Acts 1844-1862, which offered an unprecedented opportunity for 
entrepreneurs in existing firms: incorporation of sole traders and partnerships as 
limited companies suddenly became cheap and easy (Cottrell 1980), involving 
registration and a fee rather than an individual Royal Charter or Act of Parliament. 
This was a defining moment for all manufacturers and businessmen. At the time, the 
chief attraction of incorporation was limited liability; the possibility of extended 
finance from shareholders who might be willing to invest in new projects was of 
secondary importance. 
The opportunity for incorporation was also a challenge: these were uncharted waters. 
There were book-keepers, economists and engineers but no professional accounting 
body as such. The Companies Act 1862 Table A was the default model for the 
Articles of Association of a company and was optional, giving the directors complete 
freedom in the structure and management of their business affairs. Leading 
industrialists of the day were pioneers of the new corporate format. 
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Most companies incorporated in 1860-1880 had an earlier existence as partnerships 
(Shannon 1932, Payne 1984). Table A included the following two articles which are 
evidence that the legislation assumed that shareholders in a company (significantly 
referred to as `Members') would be treated as `sleeping partners' and be entitled to as 
much financial information as they might require: 
`Art. 78 The Books of Account shall be kept at the Registered Office of the 
Company and subject to any reasonable restrictions as to the time and manner 
of inspecting the same that maybe imposed by the Company in General 
Meeting, shall be open to the inspection of the Members during the Hours of 
Business. ' (emphasis added). 
`Art. 79 Once at the least in every year the Directors shall lay before the 
Company in General Meeting a Statement of the Income and Expenditure for 
the past year ... arranged under the most convenient Heads the amount of 
Gross Income, distinguishing the several Sources from which it has been 
derived, and the Amount of Gross Expenditure, distinguishing the Expense of 
the Establishment, Salaries, and other like Matters: 
Every Item of Expenditure fairly chargeable against the Year's Income shall be 
brought into Account, so that a just Balance of Profit and Loss may be laid 
before the Meeting. ' 
Contrary to the expectations of the legislators most companies did not publish a Profit 
and Loss account at all: any information on profits appeared on the balance sheet in 
the entry for the revenue reserve revealing only the allocation of the current year's 
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profit to interim and past proposed dividends. Even the published balance sheet was 
much reduced in detail from that of Table A (Edwards and Webb, 1985, p. 184). The 
annual accounts were not always distributed to shareholders and might `only be 
available for inspection at the company's registered office for a limited period' (ibid. 
p. 185-6). The degree of detail recommended in 1862 for a Profit and Loss account 
only became compulsory in the Companies Act of 1981. In general, the management 
and corporate governance of early companies resemble those of modern "close" 
companies much more than those of multinationals. 
1.3 Structure of dissertation 
The next chapter contains a review of the literature that relates to the development of 
accounting and finance over the period of the study. This is broader in scope than the 
(necessarily) narrower and more focussed discussions of the literature within the 
published papers. There follows a separate chapter devoted to the primary data which 
form the basis for all the papers. This leads on to the papers themselves, which are 
presented in the underlying sequence of topics: asset valuation, the issue of shares and 
profit recognition. This sequence is consistent with the ordering of these matters in 
the transition from partnership to limited company. 
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1.3.1 Valuation of assets for the issue of share capital 
The first financial decision that had to be made on incorporation as a company was 
how to value the assets of the trade so that ownership of assets could be exchanged for 
ownership of shares in the new company vested with these assets. Two papers in the 
dissertation are concerned with the methods employed (Pitts 1998a, 2001). The 
simplest method of asset valuation was the net book value of the fixed assets on the 
balance sheet or partnership accounts, i. e. the depreciated historic cost. This 
valuation was used in a family settlement of 1896 for Pease and Partners Ltd. and 
formed the basis of the legal case described in the paper (Pitts 1998a). The 1898 
valuation for the initial public offering (IPO) of Pease and Partners Ltd. was made by 
the accountants Price Waterhouse and was based on expected future earnings and 
dividend cover. 
One method which could not be employed was comparison with the Price/Earnings 
ratio of other coal and iron companies because trading in such shares was too thin for 
quoted prices to give any guidance on current value (Lavington, 1921 p. 221), and 
confirmed in Church (1986, p. 552). The consequent large bid-ask spread of such 
shares was found in Stock Exchange daybooks (Pitts 1998a) and from inspection of 
companies' annual returns, which were required to list both the current shareholders 
and those who had ceased to be shareholders during the financial year. The turnover 
in share ownership in all companies was found to be very low until well after 1914: 
inspection of annual returns for the 1930's (many of which are hand-written) also 
show little change from year to year. 
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The earliest valuations (1850-1870) seen in the archives for the incorporation of coal- 
mining firms and for the purchase of mines as going concerns were by the mining 
engineer and consultant William Armstrong (Pitts 2001). He used techniques which 
are regarded as modem: particularly the calculation of the net present value of future 
net cash flows discounted at risk adjusted rates (DCF). This method is generally 
thought to be a development of the twentieth century and is credited to Fisher (1930) 
in current textbooks of finance (e. g. Brealey and Myers 2000) but Pitts (2001) 
demonstrates that DCF was a standard valuation technique in regular use a century 
earlier. There is evidence of even earlier use in the valuation of real assets such as land 
and mines (Miller and Napier 1993, Scorgie 1986, Parker 1968). 
1.3.2 Share issues 
At the start of the period, 1864, initial public offerings of shares were of high 
denomination: see section 2.4. Shares were normally issued at par and part-paid; 
`calls' could be made by directors on shareholders until the share was fully paid up. 
As examples, both Staveley and Sheepbridge issued shares of £100 nominal value, 
part-paid (£60, £80) and Powell Duffryn's 1866 IPO was for shares of £5,000 with 
regular calls for £100 per share or more and dividends compulsorily re-invested in the 
company until the shares were fully paid in 1882 (Pitts 1998b). Generally calls were 
unpopular with shareholders and the most regular source of equity for any company 
after the IPO was retained earnings (typically about half: see Pitts 1998b). On 
occasion more capital contributions were required: 
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`British industry continued to maintain its operations right up to 1914 largely 
through a mixture of internal finance generated from profits and inheritance, a 
complex network of personal loans, and a fairly frequent resort to short to 
medium-term bank loans' (Kynaston 1983 p. 7). 
As a last resort, secondary issues of shares were used to widen the share capital base. 
IPOs of private companies (Pitts 1998a) were one example of this, secondary issues of 
ordinary shares (e. g. Consett and John Brown) another and purchases of assets such 
as coal mines could be financed with new shares, as was done by Henry Briggs in 
1907 (Pitts 2000). 
In IPOs and non-rights secondary issues, pricing the shares for sale to new external 
investors was a problem; the equity of the existing company consisted of not only the 
nominal value of shares issued at par at incorporation - as was the universal practice at 
the time - but also past earnings retained in the company for growth. Later issues were 
therefore made at a higher price than the nominal price of the share ("at a premium") 
to reflect the continuous investment of past shareholders through retained profits. 
Before the Companies Act of 1948, there was complete laissez-faire on the treatment 
of any share premium. There was no mention of it in any company legislation; it 
could be, and, was used for any purpose the directors thought fit - such as payment of 
dividends or depreciation of assets (effectively using the premium as a hidden 
reserve). This freedom was often explicitly stated in the Articles and undisputed until 
after 1920. 
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In Chapter 6 (Pitts 2000), the difference between the early permissive attitude on the 
use of the share premium account and modem legal restrictions, and the reason for this 
change, is analysed and explained using Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) 
reports and company prospectuses 1900-1950 from the London Stock Exchange 
Archive. The paper shows that there was a change in the nature of the share premium 
account: it was originally'a contribution by `new' shareholders in a secondary share 
issue to the accumulated retained revenues of the `old' shareholders, but after 1920 
share premiums appeared in IPOs, when they became part of the issued share capital. 
This was the result of a tax loophole, open from 1899, but not exploited until the 
capital duty rate had risen to 1% in 1920. The loophole was closed in 1973, but the 
custom of issuing shares of low nominal value at a high premium has persisted in the 
U. K. right up to the present day. 
1.3.3 Definition of profit and dividend policy 
Once the assets had been valued and shares issued, the old profit-sharing partnership 
agreements were replaced by a dividend policy. Discussion of this was not minuted; 
no mention of the topic was ever seen by this author in any records of the directors' 
meetings. There were few guidelines: article 116 of CA 1862 Table A stated that 
dividends should be paid from profits arising from the business of the company. Most 
companies adopted this in their Articles (Edwards 1989, p. 177) but Table A made no 
clear definition of profit and particularly omitted all reference to depreciation. As a 
coal mine is a wasting asset this was a significant omission (Pitts 1998b). 
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The case law on distributable profits is generally seen as inconsistent and incoherent 
giving directors little guidance or restraint (see Section 2.3.2). William Armstrong's 
position on this issue is interesting and relevant. As discussed in Chapter 7 (Pitts 
2001), he saw a clear need for a systematic depreciation policy and possibly the 
creation of a sinking fund so that the capital of the coal-mining company might be 
preserved. His advice was highly regarded and sought by many of the leading 
industrialists of his time. 
The directors of the coal companies were substantial owners of the company. In the 
sample of companies studied, ownership of directors (excluding their kin) ranged from 
100% to 4% at incorporation, with a mean of 40%, (which fell to 20% by 1914). 
Pressure to distribute dividends was hard to resist, particularly as the directors were 
not diversified in their investments and much of their personal wealth was tied up in 
the company, just as it had been when the business was a partnership. Their own 
standard of living was affected by the dividends that they proposed. 
Coal company dividend policy changed over the years - beginning with a simple 
partnership style of profit-sharing. The consequent big variations in dividends gave 
rise to shareholder complaints in poor years. Chapter 7 (Pitts 1998b) shows how 
provision for depreciation was one element which could be - and was - adjusted from 
year to year to create profits and enable dividends to be paid even in bad years. 
Generally this was not disclosed to the shareholders. The profit-sharing policy was 
gradually replaced by the payment a steady percentage of the paid-up share capital, 
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and quoted as such in The Economist. Thus shareholders ceased to be seen as partners 
or even sleeping partners but more like deposit holders in a bank or building society. 
The earliest example seen in the LSE archive was the Patent Nut and Bolt Company 
1872-1896, under Arthur Keen, founder of Guest Keen, and it was common in the first 
half of the 20th century (Florence, 1961 p. 148). 
1.4 The relevance of the issues 
This section discusses the relevance of the issues addressed in the published papers 
and what may be learnt by the study of their history. 
1.4.1 Accounting problems 
The definition of capital; the valuation of assets; the protection of creditors; the 
necessary disclosure standards of public or private companies; the need for 
depreciation of assets and the definition of distributable profits were all controversial 
before 1914 and are still matters for debate in current accounting practice, both 
nationally and internationally. Statute and case law are derived from the scandals, 
verdicts and solutions of the past. New accounting standards are regularly set up in 
an attempt to improve or refine the old. 
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1.4.2 Corporate governance 
The problems of corporate governance are subject to much recent enquiry and review 
(Hampel 1998, Greenbury 1995, Cadbury 1991) and currently shareholder approval of 
Director remuneration in aggregate is being considered. Directors of the largest 
companies are no longer owner-managers but agents. Ensuring that company assets 
are managed for the benefit of shareholders and not abused for the benefit of directors 
has evaded the best efforts of the legislature, particularly when one director is a very 
powerful and aggressive personality (Napier 1999, Kay and Silbertson 1995). 
Current "received wisdom" is that agency problems can be reduced by aligning the 
interests of directors with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). To this 
end, directors are granted employee stock options which increase in value with the 
value of the company. The efficacy of this theory might be challenged by looking at 
the past: in early companies, directors' and shareholders' interests were very closely or 
even fully aligned but this did not eliminate accounting and financing problems or the 
abuse of directors' powers (Pitts 1998a). 
1.4.3. The effect of individuals on accounting and finance 
A number of individuals mentioned in the dissertation had a powerful effect on the 
financial decisions and policies of the new limited liability companies and on 
company legislation. Many have entries in the Dictionary of Business Biography. 
One example was David Chadwick: 
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`who as one concerned with the formation of some of the most important 
limited companies in the first thirty years of limited liability knew more about 
the workings of the system than any one single person' (Jefferys 1946 p. 49). 
There were others: William George Armstrong, Arthur Keen, Isaac Lothian, Henry 
Pochin, David Dale. Many set the standards for industry in their own companies and 
were consulted by Parliament on amendments to company law (Pitts 2000,2001, 
1998a). 
The subject of Pitts (2001) is an important but forgotten individual: William 
Armstrong of Newcastle (1810-1896). He is another of those who had an important 
influence in his day, hitherto obscured by his more famous namesake, and his 
correspondence confirms the financial sophistication of Victorian entrepreneurs. He 
was a consultant Mining Engineer and "was generally regarded in the North of 
England as the father of the coal trade, his advice being sought in almost every 
difficulty that arose: in fact no man in his profession was more trusted or more 
respected" (from his obituary Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers 
1897-8). This is no mean tribute for the time and place. The paper (Pitts 2001) 
identifies Armstrong as an important disseminator of valuation and management 
accounting techniques and confirms Parker's view that in the coal and iron industry 
"the extension of discounting to investment in fixed assets ... was 
based on the work 
of engineers and economists" (Parker (1968), p. 58). 
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1.5 Conclusion 
Great Britain was the undisputed leader of industry in the nineteenth century and 
pioneered the processes and regulations for companies limited by simple registration. 
Forces for change were economic and social; there were no comparable institutions 
overseas to set the standards. These processes were open to abuse. Investors were 
exposed to fraudulent prospectuses and secretive directors and the laissez-faire 
government policy which prevailed throughout the period did little to protect them. 
The very survival of the limited company was uncertain. The history of company law 
traces the legal steps taken to increase disclosure which is a necessary but not 
sufficient prerequisite for shareholders to exercise control over their assets. 
In this series of papers, the emphasis has been placed on the underlying reasons for 
change and how these have been channeled into new practices, working wherever 
possible from primary data. The aspects considered in depth are identified in Sections 
1.3 and 1.4. The process of change was continuous; the coal industry experienced 
many changes of fortune after 1914. As part of an ongoing research programme, 
collection of primary data up to the time of the nationalisation of the coal companies 
in 1946 is currently in progress with the aim of analysing later accounting 
developments in this industry. 
1.16 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
A full bibliography containing all the references cited is to be found at the end of the 
dissertation. In addition, each individual published paper (Chapters 4- 7) ends with a 
specific list of references, indicating the relevant literature sources. The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide a broader review of the literature in order to put the material 
of the papers in context. 
Industrial finance and accounting in Britain for the period which ended with the First 
World War has been studied extensively in the last century. In this dissertation the 
analysis has been based on primary rather than secondary sources - chiefly, but not 
exclusively, relating to coal mining activities. The primary documents and the 
methodology are discussed in Chapter 3. 
It has been argued above (section 1.1) that the conclusions of these published papers 
apply not only to the coal industry but also to many other sectors of the nineteenth 
century economy. A unique exception (so far) is on record: for part of the important 
cotton industry, the large cotton coarse spinning industry in Lancashire: 
`the crucial characteristic of this particular sector of the industry was that for 
over 30 years, between approximately 1860 and the late 1890s, a very 
significant proportion of its companies engaged in a policy of full and public 
disclosure of accounting data' (Toms 1998 p. 222). 
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The practice was due to the localised nature of the trade and investors and the 
popularity of share ownership, combined with an active market in shares on the 
Lancashire Stock Market in Oldham (and not on the London market). The breakdown 
of the Oldham cooperative principle from 1880 onwards was due to an economic 
depression and consequent working class disillusionment with investment leading to a 
changing pattern of share ownership from employees to wealthy individuals. This, in 
turn, led to a growth in private and secretive companies (ibid. ), with similar practices 
to those discussed above. The coarse spinning industry 1860-1890 is the exception 
which proves the rule. 
Whereas the work discussed above related primarily to research in coal and allied 
industries, the study of the growth of the share premium (Pitts 2000) has its genesis in 
a tax-avoidance technique and is therefore applicable to all sectors of trade and 
industry in Britain. This paper traces the interesting development of this accounting 
device from its `discovery' as a Stamp Duty avoidance technique to its current role in 
capital maintenance. 
2.2 Companies after the reform of company law 1855-1862 (all papers) 
A frequently cited passage from Cottrell (1980) sets the scene: 
`The total reform of English company law during the 'sews between 1%SS atld 
1962 marks a sudden and sharp break; change both before and subsequently 
was a long drawn out, gradual process. Not only was the pace suddenly 
quickened, but the law itself was turned upside down, with all the barriers in the 
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way of company formation being removed. This extreme degree of 
permissiveness was to become the hallmark of English law. ' (p. 54). 
Effective general limited liability started with the Joint Stock Companies Act of 
1856 and the fate of the first 5000 (actually 4859) registered in London under this 
Act before December 1865 has been traced in a series of papers by Shannon, 
published in 1932-3. Some companies never started ('abortive'), or were wound 
up voluntarily or sold or amalgamated or reconstructed, but more than half became 
insolvent within less than eight years of promotion. 54% of the first 5000 had 
ceased to exist after 10 years (Shannon 1932a p. 418). Fraud was suspected in a 
material but unspecified number of cases: 
`For the benefit of promoters and their professional allies, the lawyers and 
accountants, many companies were deliberately set up in order that after a 
short fictitious existence they might pass into the winding up process, with 
birth and burial expenses accruing to their creators. * It would be arranged that 
the first charge on the capital received from investors should be the 
preliminary promoting and vendor charges, which satisfied the first of the trio, 
and a preferential charge on the assets in winding up was (and is) the legal 
expenses, which satisfied the other two. ' (Shannon 1932a p. 415) 
Shannon also calculated the `factor of fraud, ignorance and misjudgment' in 
company promotions in 1856-65 (35.9%), 1866-75 (37.1%), and 1875-83 (36.2%): 
`The investor, it seems, was neither homo economicus nor homo sapiens. ' 
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(Shannon 1933 p. 302). In another contemporary paper there is the following 
comment on the speculative (and possibly fraudulent) company, explaining the 
reasoning behind the introduction of capital duty and it is a relevant preliminary to 
Pitts 2000: 
`The problem of the speculative company existed also in the eighteen-eighties, 
for according to the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and 
Industry the cure was to be found in an increase in the fee for registration. 
When the Share Capital Duty was raised gradually this effect followed, and the 
problem of investment in speculative companies tended to become subordinate 
to that of investment in badly managed companies. ' (Todd 1932 p. 69) 
It is important to note that the companies studied in this dissertation were the 
survivors and were set up in good faith. There is, therefore, an inevitable 
survivorship bias in the papers. Data for the failures has not survived (Church 
1986 p. 518). 
2.3 Disclosure to shareholders (Pitts 1998b) 
By contrast with normal commercial and industrial enterprises, during the period 
before 1856: 
`no one seemed to have queried the right of railway companies to have limited 
liability. It was taken for granted that where a large capital beyond the means 
of a few partners was needed for a work of acknowledged public usefulness, 
the subscribers should be given that privilege.... As the members had no real 
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control over the company, limited control must be balanced by limited 
responsibility, if the capital was to be raised. ' (Shannon 1932b p. 286) 
Railways belonged to a different class of companies whose activities were 
regulated: they were required to issue Profit and Loss accounts to their shareholders 
by specific Acts of Parliament (Jones and Aiken 1994 pp. 207-218). Section 1.2 
lists the numbers and sectors for regulated and chartered companies in 1844. 
Many of them were natural monopolies and their operations `could affect safety in 
two ways: the physical and the financial' (Parker 1990 p. 57). The legislators and 
bureaucrats were conscious `not just of the interests of shareholders and creditors 
but also of the consumers of (railway) services ... and of the government 
itself' 
(ibid. p. 58) - hence the strict reporting rules for railway companies and similar 
requirements for public utilities and financial institutions such as banks and life 
assurance companies. These requirements did not apply to limited companies 
created by registration in the period 1856-1862: 
`With respect to commercial and industrial companies there is cause for 
believing that regulators sought to minimise disclosure to an acceptable 
minimum. For instance, evidence given to the Gladstone Committee (1841-3) 
and the Davey Committee on Company Law Amendment (1895-8) revealed 
that witnesses were firmly opposed to the disclosure of the profit and loss 
account. ' (Jones and Aiken 1994 p. 221) 
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Politicians assumed (see page 1.6) that shareholders of companies, working in the 
competitive fields developed by partnerships, could as `members' receive all the 
financial information they needed by inspecting the company records or by enquiry 
at General Meetings: `In shareholder/director relationships the market was not 
expected to fail' (Parker 1990 p. 55). However, it frequently did. Minutes of 
Annual General Meetings for coal companies revealed that shareholders asking 
questions were snubbed and their questions left unanswered. This was general: 
The Economist, in an editorial on `The Rights of Shareholders' thought that the 
legislature should: 
`... convince the directors that they are the servants and not the masters of the 
shareholders. Autocracy may have its advantages in some spheres of life but it 
is distinctly out of place at the meetings of public companies. ' 
(April 8 1899 p. 499) 
As further confirmation, the following was found to be true at P&O in the 1920s: 
`... it must have taken some courage for a shareholder to stand up at the 
Annual General Meeting after Inchcape (the Chairman) had spoken and ask 
detailed questions' and 
`little use was made of questions at the Annual Meeting as a means of 
obtaining further details about the accounts, and when shareholders did ask 
questions they rarely received informative answers. ' 
(Napier 1991 pp. 309-310). 
As late as 1936, Arthur Chamberlain, as Chairman of Tube Investments, was 
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castigating Ordinary Shareholders for their indifference, referring to `tens of 
thousands of bad shareholders - foolish, credulous, short-sighted, ignorant and 
easy-going' (Baxter 1950 p. 212): 
I do wish shareholders would realise that they are not only trustees for their 
own capital, they are trustees for our workpeople's employment, and for the 
honour and credit of England's industries. They are neglecting their duty and 
creating unemployment if they do not attempt to distinguish between good and 
bad management, and make some sort of effectual protest directly things begin 
to go wrong. The indications are nearly always there to be read... ' 
(ibid. p. 205) 
That may have been true for Arthur Chamberlain, but these comments were made 
soon after the publication of Berle and Means' seminal book (1932) on the divorce 
between ownership and control of 200 large quoted companies in the USA, 
indicating that the problem was fundamental and universal. A search by J. R. 
Edwards (1981) in 12 steel and iron company accounts over the period 1900-1940 
reveals that most of his selected companies did not in fact publish a profit and loss 
account until this became compulsory in CA 1929 s. 39 (p. 12-15), and Edwards and 
Webb (1985) point out that `the consensus in favour of keeping financial disclosure 
to a minimum ... remained free from serious challenge for further 25 years' 
(from 
1906: p. 184). 
The most frequently cited papers to criticise the accounting practices of Victorian 
entrepreneurs, particularly with regard to the lack of disclosure and the failure to 
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distinguish between capital and revenue, are by Brief (1965,1966,1990). More 
recently, historic company published statements were summarised as follows: 
`The battery of criticisms that can be directed against their accuracy, reliability 
and consistency is so intense that one might be tempted to conclude that they 
contain no useful information at all' (Marriner 1980 p. 203) 
Arnold (1995) has argued that some of the defects pointed out by Marriner are 
general and unavoidable in any accounting system: a degree of aggregation; the 
imposition of annual accounts which do not coincide with the natural business 
cycle; the lack of consistency in definitions and practice which has persisted to at 
least CA 1948 and beyond. 
Other criticisms such as the manipulation of profits by altering the depreciation 
policy or by revaluing assets were not found to be substantiated after the internal 
records of a sample of iron companies were studied in depth (Edwards and Boyns 
1994), though Pitts (1998b) found that profits were smoothed and depreciation 
policies changed to suit the directors' dividend policies in many companies. In 
response to this critique of Victorian entrepreneurs, other recent papers have shown 
that the directors had a clear understanding of depreciation and the Capital 
Maintenance Rule even if the published accounts did not disclose this (Bryer 1993, 
1998, Lamb 1997, Reid 1987). Many papers relating to the coal industry in 
particular are based on the unusually high disclosure policy and excellent archives 
of the Consett company (Baldwin and Berry 1999, Baldwin, Berry and Church 
1992,1994, Boyns and Edwards 1995) but not all: Wale 1990 discusses five 
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smaller coal companies, four in Northumberland and Durham plus the 
Warwickshire Griff Colliery; Baldwin 1994 is concerned with the Staveley archive. 
From all these it is evident that much relevant financial information was not 
disclosed to the shareholders and Pitts (1998a and b) gives further evidence of 
this. 
The use of secret reserves in industrial firms was seen (Napier 1990, Edwards and 
Webb 1985) but not widespread in the nineteenth century (Arnold 1995 p. 48). 
Moreover, standards of disclosure were actually higher in the late nineteenth 
century than in the early twentieth (Arnold 1995 p. 49). 
Modern standards of disclosure for limited companies began with the Companies 
Act of 1947 and 1948 (Edwards 1989, Bircher 1991, Maltby 2000); according to 
Jeremy (1998) this forced disclosure was the cause of a wave of mergers after 1956 
by revealing "true (and previously understated) asset values and ... which 
firms 
were bargains on the Stock Exchange" (p. 213). Directors' desire for secrecy is 
entirely rational. 
2.4 The nature of shares 1864-2000 (Pitts 2000) 
At the start of the period, 1864, issues of ordinary shares were of high 
denomination following the precedent set by banks earlier in the nineteenth 
century. The mean value of shares issued in the period 1865-1870 was above £15 
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(with a large variance) but shares of £100 were not uncommon and `more than 30 
companies had share denominations of £1,000 or over' (Jefferys 1946 p. 45, and 
more fully in his unpublished PhD thesis of 1938) and see also Cottrell, 1980 
Chapter 4. Shares were normally issued at par and part-paid; `calls' could be made 
by directors on shareholders until the share was fully paid up. Those shareholders 
who did not pay a call would forfeit their existing subscription. 
In the majority of cases there was no initial intention of calling up the whole of the 
amount of the share and this fact was advertised in the Prospectus (Jefferys 1946 
p. 46) but the potential liability remained. This system was not popular with 
shareholders: 
`Shareholders had good cause to dislike additional calls. They often came at 
embarrassing times. They were frequently made by companies which were in 
desperate financial straits, and there was thus presented to the stockholder the 
prospect of sending good money after bad. Moreover the shares upon which 
calls were unpaid were not transferable' (Evans 1936 p. 41). 
The potential liability for future calls made the purchase unattractive and according 
to many Articles of Association, the Directors' approval was needed before an 
unpaid share could be sold. The unpaid portion of the share was seen as an 
excellent security for trade creditors and bank overdrafts and a protection against 
the new limited liability of investors. The difficulty in transferring such shares 
"tended to keep the composition of the shareholders stable and to interest them in 
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the concern" (Jefferys 1938 p. 175) - to treat shareholders as partners rather than 
passive investors. 
The nature of issued shares was radically changed soon after 1862: in the financial 
crisis of 1866 triggered by the collapse of the Overend Gurney bank (Cottrell, 1980 
p. 58-62; Jefferys, 1938 p. 159 and 177-180), the House of Commons and House of 
Lords were petitioned to introduce amendments to the 1862 Act allowing 
companies both to reduce their nominal share capital and to subdivide their shares, 
which was achieved. Not all sectors took advantage of this: 
`The major reason for the high and uncalled shares of the finance companies, 
banks, investment, insurance etc., was the need of this type of company, more 
than any other, for good credit and high standing in the eyes of the public and 
in the opinions of their creditors. They had little or no tangible security ... in 
the shape of land, machinery or factories, so the security took the form of large 
nominal capitals and uncalled shares' (ibid. p. 194). 
The coal companies studied changed the format of their shares but not immediately: 
those who had been incorporated with high denomination part paid shares 
restructured their capital to £10 or £1 fully paid shares in the period 1890-1910. 
Pitts 1998 gives two annual returns for Pease: the first, dated 1883, features £100 
shares, with £80 paid; the second, dated 1900, features £10 shares, fully paid. 
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After 1920, the nature of shares changed again, gradually, due to an avoidance 
technique discovered in the rules for Capital Duty, where the nominal value of the 
authorised share capital was liable for the duty on incorporation, but any share 
premium on issue was not. As a result the format for Initial Public Offerings 
became 51= (25p) shares at a premium of 151= or more (Pitts 2000) instead of the 
previous standard £1 shares at par or at a small premium. Logically, therefore, the 
share premium was as much part of the share capital as the nominal value of the 
shares. This was a real change in the nature of the share premium. This fact was 
recognized by the ICAEW and featured in their submission to the Cohen 
Committee when consulted on the introduction of no par value (npv) shares. As a 
result, the share premium was classified as capital and non-distributable in the 
Companies Act of 1948 (Napier and Noke 1991, Pitts 1998b, Maltby, 2000). The 
problems resulting from this law in merger accounting have been discussed by 
Napier and Noke (1991). The npv share was rejected by the Cohen Committee and 
again by the Gedge Committee (1954) and is currently under review in a DTI 
discussion document. Noke has published papers on npv shares in 1981 and 2000, 
arguing adoption of the format. 
The tax loophole which created the high share premiums was closed in 1973 and 
Capital Duty has since been abolished entirely (in 1995) but the format of 25p 
shares at a premium has persisted - possibly due to fifty years of custom and 
expectations of consistency between companies and within them. No other 
reference to this transformation has been found in the literature and Pitts 2000 
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extends the work done by Jefferys (1938) to the present day in explaining the 
format of modern share issues. 
2.5 The market for shares and the importance of dividends 
(Pitts 1998a, 1998b) 
Even after the reduction of shares to more manageable nominal values of £10 or 
less (and fully paid up soon after issue) trading in commercial and industrial shares 
was very thin. Much of the initial trading in coal and iron shares was so thin that 
Chadwick's unpublished Investment Circular (1870-1875) gave more relevant and 
specific information on such shares than any of the London Stock Exchange 
records. Apart from the London Stock Exchange, there were provincial exchanges 
in cities such as Manchester, Sheffield and Cardiff for local industries (textiles, 
steel, coal) and municipal stocks and even smaller Exchanges such as Oldham 
(Thomas 1973 chapter 6). However, speaking well after 1914: 
`It may not be assumed that this organization, extensive as it is, enables all 
securities, or even any very large proportion of them, to be readily marketed. 
Even on the London Stock Exchange, as is well known, the quotations of many 
securities are only nominal: they have no active market and can be dealt with 
only at a considerable sacrifice in price. Provincial markets are naturally far 
less effective; many small but sound industrials can neither be bought nor sold 
within any reasonable margin of price or period of time; the holders of such 
securities are often, in this respect, little better than partners in the business ... 
' 
(Lavington 1921 p. 221, emphasis added). 
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In confirmation of the low marketability of shares, Lowenfeld (quoted in Kynaston 
1983 p. 245) stated that there was at any one time a genuinely free market in about 
400 out of the 5000 quoted securities on the London Stock Exchange in 1909. As 
far as primary issues were concerned, the London Stock Exchange was more 
expensive, offered inadequate protection against pre-allotment dealings and 
speculators, did not guarantee the prospectus and did not ensure ready marketability 
of shares once issued (Kynaston 1983 pp. 343-5). It is therefore not surprising that: 
`... in the specific sphere of the provision of new capital to home industries, ... 
it is generally accepted that the formal capital market (including the provincial 
stock exchanges as well as London) supplied only about 10% of such 
investment' and 
`British industry continued to maintain its operations right up to 1914 largely 
through a mixture of internal finance generated from profits and inheritance, a 
complex network of personal loans, and a fairly frequent resort to short to 
medium-term bank loans' (Kynaston 1983 pp. 6 and 7). 
Shares were held for long periods and the bid-ask spread for industrial and 
commercial shares was high (Pitts 1998a). Other than at incorporation, shares and 
share issues were not a significant a source of new finance before 1914 due to the 
poor secondary market. This was not seen as a financial handicap at the time, but 
shareholders, who might be discontented with a company's low dividend payout 
policy, did not have the easy modern alternative of selling the shares, realising a 
capital gain (`a homemade dividend') and investing elsewhere (Miller and 
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Modigliani 1961). Shareholders were not indifferent to the dividend policy of the 
directors and it is not surprising that most of the important cases on dividends were 
decided in the period 1865-1900 (Edwards 1989 pp. 177-187). 
2.6 Case law on distribution of profits (Pitts 1998b, 2001) 
The judgment in Trevor v. Whitworth 1887 explained the limitations imposed on 
distributions by limited liability companies and is cited in Edwards 1939 p. 171: 
`(for) a company where the liability is limited ... to assure those dealing with 
the company that the whole of the subscribed capital ... shall remain available 
for the discharge of its liabilities. ... A part of it may be lost in carrying out 
business operations authorised (by the Objects clause of the Memorandum). 
Of this all persons trusting the company are aware, and take the risk. But I 
think they have the right to rely, and were intended by the legislature to have 
the right to rely, on the capital remaining undiminished by any expenditure 
outside these limits, or by the return of any part of it to the shareholders. ' 
The payment of dividends should come from profits, defined as the increase in the 
value of the company over the year, and to pay dividends implied (to creditors, 
investors and potential investors) that profits had indeed been made. This is 
generally known as the Capital Maintenance Rule (CMR) (French 1977 p. 306-9). 
However, profits were never defined as such, and the need for a depreciation policy 
to allow for the erosion in value of plant, equipment, mining deposits or mining 
leases to be part of the Profit and Loss account was never legally required. 
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It was also not clear whether past losses should be recouped before dividends could 
be paid and whether this applied equally to preference dividends, or whether 
dividends could only be paid from trading profits and not from capital gains. In 
view of all these uncertainties, the case law on distributable profits is generally seen 
as inconsistent and incoherent (Yamey 1941 and 1962, French 1977, Reid 1987, 
Marriner 1980), giving directors little guidance or restraint, although Bryer (1998) 
disagrees. He maintains that judgments were entirely consistent with the CMR 
doctrine until 1889 when `general agreement on the theory of accounting was 
shattered by Lee' (p. 26). `Lee' refers to a very significant case: Lee v Neuchatel 
1889, which seemed to give explicit permission to directors to omit depreciation 
from their profit and loss accounts for wasting assets: 
`There is nothing in the Companies Acts to prohibit a company formed to work 
a wasting property, as e. g., a mine or patent, from distributing, as dividend, the 
excess of proceeds of working above the expenses of working, nor to impose 
on the company any obligation to set apart a sinking fund to meet the 
depreciation in the value of the wasting property' (decision of Stirling, J). 
There is some evidence that depreciation accounting declined in British mining 
companies after this decision (Morris 1986). However, the conclusion one draws 
from the literature and the case law is that directors had great economic freedom in 
deciding their dividend policy, particularly when they could claim an adequate 
provision for depreciation. Pitts 1998b confirms this view and gives a statistical 
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analysis of the connection between dividends and depreciation policy, arguing that 
the requirement to pay dividends dominated the depreciation policy. 
2.7 Dividend policies (Pitts 1998b) 
The first directors of the coal and iron companies were owner-managers, who were 
not diversified in their investments and relied on dividends to maintain their 
standard of living (Edelstein 1970, Thomas 1973), just as they had depended on the 
partnership profits which generally preceded incorporation. The earliest dividend 
policies (1865-1914) were the distribution of a substantial proportion of the trading 
profits and very variable from year to year; see Church, 1986 p. 540. In years of 
loss, no dividends were paid. This pattern is confirmed by Walters (1977, pp. 292- 
298). He exonerates the shareholders from greed: 
It certainly cannot be said of the pre-war Welsh steam coal industry that it 
suffered from a capital starvation inflicted by the cupidity of proprietors or 
shareholders (p. 298) 
However, there were contemporary commentators such as Matheson who warned 
(in 1893) that the omission of depreciation to raise earnings and distributions might 
not leave adequate resources for repair and renewals but he was speaking of 
Tramways in particular. Edwards (1980) gives instances of excessive dividend 
payments from capital rather than revenue in some coal companies. 
After World War 1, most coal companies were paying a constant dividend, reported 
as fixed percentage of the paid-up capital (Supple, 1987 pp. 394-5) in line with 
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other industries (Florence, 1961 p. 148). After World War II, the prevailing 
dividend policy changed again to a "maintainable regular dividend on a growth 
path" (Arnold, 2002 p. 860) with a long established and generally appreciated 
"target payout ratio". This was first identified by Lintner (1956) in an empirical 
study of listed USA companies for the postwar years and was further explored in 
Fama and Babiak, 1968, Koyck 1954 and others. It is the policy taught in current 
finance textbooks such as Brealey and Myers 2001, Arnold 2002, Ross Westerfield 
and Jaffe 2000 and others. 
2.8 Management accounting (Pitts 2001) 
Management accounting is a field where inspection of surviving primary 
documents in company archives has challenged earlier `received wisdom' on the 
timing and development of management accounting practices. It was formerly 
believed that costing and financial accounts were not integrated until well into the 
twentieth century following the American model (Solomons 1952, Edwards 1937, 
Pollard 1965 cited in Boyns and Edwards 1997(both papers)) and also that there 
had been little development in costing systems until the end the nineteenth century. 
The basis for this belief was that very little cost accounting theory was published in 
the accounting literature of the nineteenth century until after 1870. It was assumed 
by the historians listed above that innovative practice would follow theory - and 
not precede it. 
A number of case studies have proved this conclusion false for the coal and iron 
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industry at least (Boyns and Edwards 1995 for Consett, Fleishman and Parker 1990 
for Carron, Boyns and Edwards 1997a for coal, iron and steel companies). 
Surviving records cited in these papers show that, from about 1850, departmental 
costs of production were calculated, overheads were apportioned to identify total 
cost and transfer prices were used to track the movement of goods between 
departments in all the companies studied throughout the period. Transfer pricing 
must always have been a problem in vertically integrated concerns where the output 
of one sector becomes the input of the next - particularly if the managers wish to 
know where profits and losses are made or in "make or buy" decisions. Debate on 
whether transfers should be made at cost or market value was recorded in several 
coal and iron companies in the 1870s (Boyns and Edwards 1997a, p. 18-9) and 
anticipate the conclusions reached nearly a century later: 
`Hinschleifer [1956,1957], in two classic articles, ... demonstrated, 
in a limited 
setting, the optimality of using the opportunity cost of the selling division as 
the appropriate market price. This rule includes the market price as a special 
case when the intermediate product is sold in a perfectly competitive market 
... ' (Kaplan, 1984, p. 402-3). 
The market for coal was always competitive (Church 1986 p. 66). William 
Armstrong is mentioned in Boyns and Edwards 1997a, (p. 19), recommending the 
market price of coal as a transfer price to Bell Brothers and an 1867 Report to 
Bolckow Vaughan (analysed in Pitts 2001) gives alternative methods for transfer 
pricing and gives reasons for adopting them. The decision is not a purely economic 
one; transfer pricing policy can be used to establish interdependence between sub- 
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units or a degree of decentralization and is a rapid and flexible management tool 
(Kaplan 1884 p. 403, Boyns, Edwards and Emmanuel 1999 p. 105). 
As far as integration of cost and financial accounting is concerned, in Britain this 
was achieved well before 1925, the date given in for the USA (Kaplan 1984 p. 396): 
Staveley's records showed `widespread integration of cost and financial accounting 
systems ... from as early as 1690' 
(Boyns and Edwards 1997a p. 10). The 
Accountant of 1892 is cited to show that Cost Accounts were taught and at least one 
relevant book on colliery cost records (Practical Book-Keeping Adapted to 
Commercial and Judicial Accounting, by F. Hayne Carter, published in Edinburgh 
in 1874) has been found. 
Early consultants like William Armstrong (Pitts 2001) were asked by directors to 
advise on a prudent depreciation policy for the management of wasting assets such 
as mines, indicating that they well understood the principle of Capital Maintenance. 
Armstrong based his calculations of the necessary provision on either the length of 
the lease (if leasehold) or the reserves of minerals (if freehold), as part of a 
programme of management accounting, as well as financial reporting. 
Altogether `a dramatic inconsistency' has been found between `the conventional 
wisdom and the contents of the archives' (Boyns and Edwards 1997a pp. 1-12). 
The study of primary documents has shown `that cost accounting practice was in 
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advance of the related theory as espoused in the literature' (p. 21), both in the recent 
literature cited above and in Pitts (2001) 
In addition to the practices discussed above, the valuation of collieries and iron works 
by the application of discounted cash flow at risk-adjusted discount rates, generally 
assumed to be a 20C invention, is shown to have been standard practice in the North 
East of England by 1850 and was in use even earlier (Parker 1968, Scorgie 1996, 
Brackenbury, McLean and Oldroyd 2001). Pitts 2001 discusses an important expert 
in this field, consulted and honoured by leading industrialists over a long period: 
William Armstrong, 1811-1896. He disseminated his knowledge widely and his 
contribution to accounting technology should be acknowledged. 
2.9 Corporate governance (Pitts 1998a)1 
The paper on the legal case involving Joseph Pease (Pitts 1998A) was inspired by 
newspaper cuttings and family letters in the Pease deposit in Durham Record Office. 
The family history "Men of Business and Politics: the Rise and Fall of the Quaker 
Pease Dynasty of North-East England 1700-1943", written by M. W. Kirby (1984) was 
essential to understand the conduct of Joseph Pease. As reported in the newspaper, the 
I Professor M. Kirby was the second referee for the Pease paper and revealed his identity by stating that he 
had already seen the manuscript when the author sent him a draft. His generous review reads as follows: 
" ... The relevant 
details are recorded accurately in the article which has clearly benefited in this respect 
from my earlier work. The article does, however, go well beyond my own treatment by raising technical 
and financial issues which are of historic and current relevance in the area of business and financial 
history. ... 
As the article states, the case of Portsmouth v. Pease raises some critical questions concerning 
share valuation and the duties of directors. More to the point, it provides some key insights into 
responsible corporate governance nearly a century before the issue appeared on the public agenda. 
Speaking for myself, "Men of Business and Politics" would have been a better book if the author's work 
had been available. " (emphasis added) 
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story was sensational and seemed inexplicable: he was a rich Quaker, highly 
esteemed, who had cheated his orphan niece out of her inheritance - the classic 
Wicked Uncle. The book explains that he had used the financial resources of the very 
successful coal company and the family bank to subsidise other family owned 
companies in order to avoid their closure and the consequent distress of the workforce 
and he had never told his fellow directors, his sons or his accountant of his actions 
(Kirby 1984, Chapter 5). This paternalistic attitude was due to his Quaker faith and 
he was convinced of the rightness of his actions. According to Kirby: 
In the running of J and JW Pease (the family bank), it may have been 
understandable, even laudable, to extend hundreds of thousands of pounds' 
worth of financial aid to loss-making companies, but this policy, exacerbated 
by the result of the Portsmouth case, was to bear fruit in the events of August 
1902 (the collapse of the bank). (ibid. p. 114) 
This comment misses the point that much of the extended financial aid channeled 
through the bank was derived from the revenues of Pease and Partners and that 
Joseph Pease was acting illegally: ultra vires. He did not understood the 
restrictions which the new company format and the Articles of Association imposed 
on the directors of any company and continued to behave as the senior and 
dominant partner in an associated group of enterprises. 
Restricting dominant and litigious directors from abusing their power is a recurrent 
problem. Robert Maxwell (Napier 1999) was arguably the most dramatic and 
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destructive British director in recent history, but the divorce between the ownership 
and control of a company has caused the collapse of many famous concerns 
`amongst allegations of false accounting and vanished assets': Barings, Polly Peck, 
BCCI (Kay and Silbertson 1995). The Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report 
(1995) and Hampel Report (1998) have introduced new codes of conduct for 
corporate governance and executive remuneration based on the assumption that 
directors are accountable to shareholders, which is the position assumed when 
companies began. 
Kay and Silbertson are sceptical of the powers of shareholders, even large 
institutional holders, to control directors: 
`We doubt whether shareholders have either incentive or capacity to provide 
such monitoring.... And we are not persuaded that the main lines of the 
proposed remedy - an enhanced role for non-executive directors, more 
extensive involvement of shareholders in major decisions, and the provision of 
fuller information about corporate affairs - presents a suitable monitoring 
mechanism. It is precisely the form of relationship which government, as 
controlling shareholder, traditionally enjoyed with nationalised industries, and 
its effect was to undermine management responsibility for corporate 
performance without providing stimulus to the effectiveness of corporations' 
(p. 94). 
In view of the failure of shareholders to control directors in the past, it may be time for 
directors to be seen as trustees, rather than agents, of shareholders in their use of 
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company assets belonging to these shareholders. Those who do not learn from history 
are bound to repeat it. 
2.10 Tertiary literature: contemporary comment (all papers) 
The Economist of the period was a valuable resource at a variety of levels. Share 
prices were given on a weekly basis. (These might be constant for periods of several 
weeks or even months for many companies and were additional evidence of thin 
trading. ) The nominal value of each share, the amount paid up, and the dividend yield 
(on the paid up nominal capital, not the market value of the share) were also given 
until 1914. Financial information in quarterly or yearly summaries of the coal and 
iron/steel industries with comparisons between leading companies has been 
transcribed. Editorial material which gave informed opinion on the financial and 
economic issues of the day, such as prospectuses, profitability and corporate 
governance has been cited in the tradition of previous and current economic historians 
such as Shannon, Napier and Kynaston. The standard of comment and debate in this 
periodical commands respect; for example the candid comments on Prospectuses 
(cited in Pitts 1998a) and editorial recommendations on necessary reforms in company 
law which anticipated legislation decades later. 
Editorials in The Accountant on subjects such as the permitted uses of the share 
premium account have been cited as the received opinion of the accountancy 
profession at the time. Information hbout price levels and inflation was taken from 
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Fischer (1986) and historical statistics such as indices of coal prices from Mitchell and 
Deane (1962). 
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Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Primary documents 
3.1.1 Coal and iron companies data Primary data were collected from 
surviving coal industry accounts and archives 1864-1914. This work was funded 
by ESRC Grant 000234513,1993-1995. In all, financial details of 35 coal 
producing companies with good surviving accounts and archives were recorded 
for a period of up to 50 years. 
The annual accounts were entered on spreadsheets, one column per year. Most 
of these were copied from the London Stock Exchange archive which begins in 
1881. In addition, directors' reports, minutes of general meetings, minutes of 
directors' meetings and surviving ledgers were studied, whenever these were 
available, and used to fill gaps in the annual accounts and to provide 
explanations of the policies employed. 
Most annual accounts were found in the London Stock Exchange Archive, 
Guildhall Library, London (starting in 1881 and stored by year and by industry). 
Alternatively, or in addition, annual accounts are stored with the remainder of 
the company's documents in National Coal Board deposits in district record 
offices such as Matlock, Sheffield, Cardiff and - for all Scottish companies - 
in 
Edinburgh. The coal company deposits, their nature and their locations are listed 
in detail in Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter. Some of the largest and most 
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successful Victorian coal producing companies were vertically integrated into 
iron and steel and significant deposits of these companies were held by British 
Steel (now Corus) at Shotton, Middlesbrough and Irthlingborough. 
3.1.2 Annual Returns for quoted companies, giving names, occupations and 
holdings of current shareholders and names of those who have ceased to be 
shareholders during the past year, have been pruned by past archivists and are 
not available for every year. These remaining are stored either in Kew PRO 
(Files of Dissolved Companies BT 31), or in Companies House for surviving 
companies. These archives may also contain the occasional Memorandum and 
Articles of Association. Otherwise details of share ownership were found within 
the company archive. Details and reference numbers are given in Appendix 2. 
3.1.3 Prospectuses for the issues of share capital 1900-1954. These are 
stored by year in London Guildhall Library and have been searched for the 
occurrence of any share premium and the proposed use of these funds. 
3.1.4 Other London Stock Exchange documents included the Daily Review 
and Weekly Intelligencer for share transactions (the price of the share, the 
frequency of transactions and the bid-ask spread). The manuscript section for 
applications by companies for Stock Exchange listings (MS 18000) includes 
letters and summaries addressed to the LSE by the company directors, which 
may include relevant information not available elsewhere. 
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3.1.5 William Armstrong Archive in Northumberland Record Office. This 
large and well-catalogued deposit includes documents required for valuations, 
plans and correspondence relating to specific sites, schemes and companies 
1850-1940 (NRO 725 Armstrong C), and a set of Report Books, with 
transcriptions of reports sent to clients by William Armstrong, his predecessors 
and his son Henry over the period 1836-1943 (NRO 725 Armstrong D). 
3.2 Government Publications 
Clauses of the main relevant acts of 1844 (Joint Stock Companies), 1855 
(Limited Liability) 1862 ( The Companies Act), 1867 (An Act to amend "The 
Companies Act, 1862"), and Companies Acts of 1907,1929 and 1948 were cited 
in the dissertation. 
Published reports of the Sankey Commission (1919), the Greene Committee 
(1926), the Cohen Committee (1945) the Gedge Committee (1954) and the 
Jenkins Committee (1962) have been studied, together with the minutes of the 
committees which gave rise to the reports. Unpublished minutes are stored in 
the Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew. 
Recent investigations on corporate governance (Cadbury 1992, Greenbury 1995 
and Hampel 1998) are also relevant to this thesis. Other recent reports include 
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the DTI consultative document for Reform of Company Law (1998) which is the 
most recent government publication to be discussed in the dissertation (Pitts 
2000). This document discusses the abolition of the share premium in the UK 
possibly following recent Australian legislation: the Australian Company Law 
Review Act of 1998 repealed the share premium in Australia. Shares there have 
become No Par Value shares. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) Reports for various years from 
1892 to 1946 have been consulted for information about stamp and capital duty 
receipts and the number of company incorporations within each tax year. The 
list of Government publications is given in Appendix 3 at the end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 1 Coal Archives and London Guildhall Archives 
Company Location of Archives Notes 
Andrew No relevant data found No Accounts pre 1881 
Knowles Accounts LGH post 1881 
Bell Brothers Cleveland CA, Middlesbrough Partnership to 1873. 
Dorman Long papers Rich archive 
Accounts pre 1899 
Accounts LGH post 1899 
Blaenavon Coal Gwent County RO Gaps in accounts: 1883- 
& Iron Co. D 480 Account books post 1904 1891 and 1897 
Directors Minutes 1880-1914 
Accounts Gwent pre 1892 
Accounts LGH post 1892 
Bolckow Cleveland CA (transfer from Very full archive, no 
Vaughan British Steel) Dorman Long longer catalogued. 
papers. 
Accounts Cleveland pre 1881 
Accounts LGH post 1881 
Butterley Derbyshire RO, Matlock Partnership pre 1888. 
NCB N4 and N36 and D 503B Limited by guarantee. 
Accounts Derby RO only Good archive. 
Cannock Chase Birmingham University Business Accounts missing 
Records 14/ii/1-19 1912-14. 
Minutes 1859-1929 Good archive 
Accounts Birmingham only 
Carlton Main Sheffield RO MD 4081-4087 Good archive 
Directors Minutes. 
Accounts Sheffield only 
Carron Iron Co. Minutes of General Court Very large archive. 
GD 58 22/1/5-8 Royal Charter company 
Dividend Book GD 58 3/2/1 
Accounts Edinburgh GD 58 
4/2/1-40 
Consett (now AGM Minutes 1864-1947 Very large archive, no 
part of British Fixed Assets and many ledgers longer catalogued 
Steel) now with Derwent Local History 
Society 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
D. Davis and None found 
Son Accounts LGH 1890 onwards 
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Company Location of Archives Notes 
Ebbw Vale Gwent RO MSS 788 No earlier accounts 
Company History 1893 found. 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards Scanty archive 
Guest Keen Birmingham Central Library, MS 
298 for Nettlefolds 
Guest Keen at GKN plc Redditch 
Accounts LGH 1900 onwards 
Dowlais (later Glamorgan RO, Cardiff D/DG 
part of Guest Misc. Ledger with annual 
Keen) accounts 1863-1875 and E3/21- 
39. Box of reports 1863-1884 
Merged with Nettlefolds 
1902. Very full archive 
at company HQ 
Partnership. 
No annual accounts 
after 1884 
Hamstead Staffordshire RO, Stafford No balance sheet 1911 
D 876/1-31 Minutes 1875-1930 Good archive. 
D 1230 Nom. Ledger 1881-1888, 
including accounts. 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
Henry Briggs Leeds Brotherton Library Very full archive 
MS 160 Directors Minutes 
1865-1914. West Yorks R0, 
Leeds ACC1351 A2/3-29 
miscellaneous ledgers 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
John Brown Sheffield R0. Firth-Brown Firth-Brown archive has 
archive recently transferrred; not not kept pre 1881 
catalogued. accounts for John 
Post 1881 only Brown 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
Lochgelly Edinburgh RO SRO/CB2/218 
Abstract Book 1876-87 
CB2/192-. Minute Books 1870 
on CB2/146 and CB2/119 
Journals and Ledgers 
Accounts LGH 1897 onwards 
Accounts missing 1888- 
1895.1896 accounts 
reconstructed from 
ledger CB2/121 
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Company Location of Archives 
Main Colliery West Glamorgan RO, Swansea 
Company WGAS/DD/MC 1-8 
Accounts WGAS/DD/MC6 only 
Mitchell Main Sheffield Central Library 
NCB 599,608(a), 601,573-5 
Annual Accounts & Journals 
1883-1914. 
New Sharlston West Yorks RO, Halifax 
Crossley papers DC2253-7 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
Notes 
Very complete archive 
for 1890-1914 
Company held shares in 
Carlton Main from 1897 
Gap in accounts 
1874-1880 
North Welsh Industrial & Maritime 1893 accounts missing 
Navigation Co. Museum WIMM 85.181.1.1 
Private Ledgers 
Accounts LGH 1889 onwards 
Pearson & BSC Shotton Good archive 
Knowles Dep. 433/9 Dirs. Reports 1873- 
1914 Dep. 433/2 Ledger Iron 
Dept. 1873-84 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
Pease & Durham RO NCB 1/X No records from earlier 
Partners Accounts LGH 1900 onwards incorporation 1883 
Legal case on share valuation 
1900 D/Pe3/130 
Powell Duffryn Glamorgan Record Office Big gap in accounts 
D/D PD 1/1-6 Minutes of 1866-1888 
Directors' meetings, AGMs and Rhymney Iron part of 
EGMs 1864-1914 Powell Duffryn deposit 
Accounts LGH 1888 onwards 
Sheepbridge Derbyshire RO, D 503B, D 3808 Very complete records 
Directors Minutes 1864-1958; 
also ledgers and journals 1864 on 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
Shelton Bar Staffs RO D 4810/1/2 Profits Partnership to 1882. No 
Iron Company 1890-1920. British Steel, records seen 1886-89 
Shelton Iron Shotton dep. 472/3 and 6 and and no explanation 
Steel & Coal SR1/2/4. found 
Accounts LGH 1892 onwards 
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Company Location of Archives Notes 
Shotts Iron Co. SRO Edinburgh GD1/3/15-23 Incorporated by Acts of 
Complete Directors Minutes with Parliament 1871 and 
annual accounts from 1871 1877. 
Accounts LGH 1899 onwards 
South Hetton Durham Record Office NCB No earlier accounts 
13/215 and NCB 1/X/44 found and poor archive. 
Accounts LGH 1887 onwards 
Staveley Derbyshire RO, D 3808 Minutes Very good archive 
& ledgers 1863-1930 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
The Rhymney Glamorgan RO Cardiff D/D Part of Powell Duffryn 
Iron Co. PD53 and RH 269 and RH 6-11 deposit 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
Tredegar Gwent RO, Cwmbran MSS 1147 Archive lost? Listed as 
Commemorative leaflet 1923 with John Brown, but 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards not found 
Walsall Wood Staffs RO D876/39-41 Good archive 
Directors Minutes 1876-1914 
Wigan Wigan RO Very full and complete 
Shotton D433 & D492 archive 
Accounts LGH 1881 onwards 
LGH is the London Guildhall Library, London Stock Exchange Archive, (Coal and 
Iron). Accounts are filed by year. 
BSC stands for British Steel Company Archives, which were stored at 
Irthlingborough, Middlesbrough and Shotton. Much of this has been dismantled 
recently by Corus PLC. 
Other London Guildhall collections consulted: 
London Guildhall Library Prospectuses 1900-1950 
London Guildhall Library London Stock Exchange Daily Review / Stock Exchange 
Weekly Intelligence 
London Guildhall Library MS 18000 Application for Listing 
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Appendix 2 Annual Returns for share ownership data 
Company Dates of Source of Information 
incorporation 
Andrew Knowles. 1873 BT 31 14470/7902 
Bell Brothers 1872,1895, BT 31 31676/60411 
1898 
The Blaenavon Company 1880 BT 31 38190 
Bolckow Vaughan 1864 BT 31 30734/1705 
Butterley Company 1888 CH 26306 
Cannock Chase 1859 BT 31 36624/1468 
Carlton Main Colliery 1872 Sheffield RO MD 4080 
Carron Iron Company 1776 SRO GD 58/1/14 
Consett 1864 CH 1140 
D. Davis & Son 1890 BT 31205/31383 
Ebbw Vale 1864,1866 BT 31 33755/3956 
Guest Keen (later Guest 1900 CH 66549 
Keen and Nettlefold) 
Hamstead Colliery Co. 1875 BT 31 14531/9441 
Henry Briggs 1865 BT 31 38180 
John Brown 1863 CH 1125 
Lochgelly 1873,1896 SRO BT 2/400 
Main Colliery 1889 BT 31 31167/29139 
Mitchell Main Colliery 1882 BT 31 36777/17707 
New Sharlston Collieries 1865,1873 BT 31 37016 
North's Navigation 1889 LGH MS 18000 
Collieries (1889) 
Pearson and Knowles 1873,1899 LGH MS 18000/62B 
Pease and Partners 1883,1898 BT 31 37136 
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Company Dates of Source of information 
incorporation 
Powell Duffryn 1864 BT 31 30728 
Sheepbridge 1864 BT 31 3877/1594C 
Shelton Iron, Steel and 1886,1889 BT 31 3655/22608 
Coal Company 
Shotts 1871,1877, SRO BT 2 3597 and 3633 
1897 
South Hetton 1874,1899 BT 31 1997/8571 
BT 31 36839/57257 
Staveley 1864 CH 866C 
The Rhymney Iron Co. 1871 BT 31 30796/5346 
Tredegar Iron & Coal 1873 BT 31 37002 - 7/7116 
Walsall Wood 1875 BT 31 37022/10004 
Wigan. 1864 BT 31 37920 -1 
BT 31 Kew Public Records Office, Board of Trade Records BT31 
Defunct Companies Files 
SRO BT2 Scottish Records Office, Edinburgh, Defunct Companies Files 
CH Companies House, London. 
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Appendix 3 Government Papers 
An Act to amend `The Companies Act, 1862. '(1867), Law Reports and Statutes 30- 
31 VIC.: 1372-1386, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1892). Thirty Fifth Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1892, (C. -6731), HMSO, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1898). Forty First Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1898, (C. - 9020), HMSO, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1905). Forty Eighth Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1905, (Cd. 2633), HMSO, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1911). Fifty Fourth Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1911, (Cd. 5833), HMSO, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1921). Sixty Fourth Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1921, (Cmd. 1436), HMSO, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1926). Sixty Ninth Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1926, (Cmd. 2783), HMSO, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1929). Seventy Second Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1929, (Cmd. 3500), HMSO, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1939). Eighty Second Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1939, (Cmd. 6099), HMSO, London. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (CIR) (1946). Eighty Ninth Report of the 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year ended 31st March 
1946, (Cmd. 7067), HMSO, London. 
Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (Hampel Committee Report), 
(1998), Gee Publishing, London. 
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Department of Trade and Industry (1998), 'Modern Company Law: For a 
Competitive Economy' HMSO, London. 
Directors' Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury (Greenbury Committee Report), (1995), Gee Publishing, London. 
Gedge Committee (1954), Shares of No Par Value (Cmnd. 9112), HMSO, London. 
Greene Committee (1926), Company Law Amendment 1926 (Cmd. 2657) HMSO, 
London. 
Jenkins Committee (1962), Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd. 1749) 
HMSO London. 
Kew PRO Committee of 1929 Companies Act BT 146 1/12. 
Ministry of Fuel and Power, Coal Mining. Report of the Technical Advisory 
Committee. March 14,1945 (Charles C. Reid) Cmd. 6610 IV, London: HMSO. 
Minutes of Evidence taken before the Company Law Amendment Committee (1944), 
London: HMSO (Cohen Committee). 
Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, 1945 (Cohen Committee) 
(Cmnd. 6659) HMSO, London. 
Reports of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (Sankey), (1919), HMSO, 
London. 
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(Cadbury Committee Report), (1992), Gee Publishing, London. 
Select Committee to Limited Liability Act 1867 B. P. P. 1867 (329), Vol. X, 393 
HMSO, London. 
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Chapter 4 Victorian share-pricing -a problem in thin trading. 
Accounting, Business and Financial History Vol. 8 No. 1 1998 pp. 33-52 
(Pitts 1998A) 
Chapter 5 In praise of the "other" William Armstrong: a nineteenth century 
British engineer and early management consultant 
Accounting History NS Vol. 6, No. 2, November 2001 pp. 33-58 
(Pitts 2001) 
Chapter 6 The rise and rise of the share premium account 
Accounting, Business and Financial History Vol. 10, No. 3,2000 pp. 317-346 
(Pitts 2000) 
Chapter 7 Did dividends dictate depreciation in British coal companies 
1864-1914? 
Accounting Histor_yNS Vol. 3, No. 2, November 1998 pp. 37-67 
(Pitts 1998B) 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The papers presented in this dissertation develop related themes of asset valuation, 
recognition of profit and dividend policy in the evolution of accounting practice in an 
age of laissez-faire. Such company legislation as took place was in response to crises 
(the bank collapse of 1866) and manifest fraud, such as dishonest promotions, which 
gave rise to the CA 1900 (Edwards 1998 pp. 220-222). Despite wide knowledge of 
different valuation techniques and a clear understanding of the importance of 
depreciation in the exploitation of a wasting asset, the development of accounting 
practice was pragmatic and the policies were often chosen to suit short term goals such 
as desired dividends or a low / high asset valuation. 
Modern company legislation and present practice in accounting, finance and 
governance are based on the past and cannot be understood out of context. History is 
path dependent. As an example, see Pitts 2000: the treatment of the share premium as 
capital (1948) followed the new practice of issuing IPO shares of low nominal value at 
a high premium when this became an advantageous tax avoidance technique after 
1920. The practice remains, even though the tax advantage disappeared in 1973. 
After nearly half a century of issuing a 25p share at a large premium to raise £1 or 
more of capital, the earlier standard £1 share at a zero or small premium was 
effectively forgotten. Pitts 2000 extends the work of Jefferys (1938) and Cottrell 
(1980) in explaining the development of the format of modem British share issues. 
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Private (or `close' or family) companies are the logical result or progression of 
partnerships which incorporated to achieve limited liability, and much of the coal 
industry retained this format up to 1914 and beyond (Supple 1987 p. 361). More 
generally: 
`Almost 60 per cent of the paid up capital of "new" companies between 1885 
and 1914 had gone to the vendors rather than being contributed by the public, 
many of the businessmen raising extra capital by the Stock Exchange had no 
intention of letting any outsider control their company. They usually sold 
largely fixed interest preference shares or debentures to the public, which did not 
carry voting rights, and issued most, if not all, of the ordinary shares to 
themselves, keeping control of their firms in their own hands or those of a few 
friends, ex-partners or their family. ' (Mathias 1983 pp. 353-4). 
In partnerships, and in the private companies that followed, commercial 
information was regarded as private. Standards of disclosure were low in all major 
industrial sectors (Arnold 1997). Modern disclosure standards began in 1948 
(Maltby 2000, Edwards 1989 p. 209). Company law still requires fewer disclosures 
from private companies than from Public Limited Companies; for example, small 
private companies have been exempted from the requirement to publish a Profit and 
Loss account audit since 1992 (Amendments to CA 1985, issued Nov. 1992) and 
the turnover threshold for the statutory audit was raised to £350,000 in 1998. These 
are issues which are constantly under review. 
8.2 
There is a view, based on the writings of Alfred Chandler (1976) and Payne (1967) 
that the success and development of twentieth century British industry was 
restricted by its failure to develop beyond the family company. This view has been 
refuted by Church (1992) in a paper discussing and comparing family firms in 
Britain, US, Germany and Japan. He argues that in matters concerning dividend 
policies, diversification strategies, adaptability and strength of management: 
`International comparisons suggest that greater attention should be paid to the 
cultural differences which produced contrasting behaviour and performance 
regardless of the major characteristics of corporate structures. ' 
(Church 1992 p. 39) 
There is recent evidence that much of the current wealth of the US is still held in such 
family companies and not quoted on Stock Exchanges (Heaton and Lucas, 2000) and 
this is also true of Western Europe (Financial Times October 30 2001, p. 18). The 
financial rewards of ownership in small companies were (and remain) the dividends 
received since the shares cannot easily be sold. Dividends are restricted by the profit 
available for distribution, which is, in turn, dependent on the depreciation policies 
pursued by the company. This has been analysed for a sample of key coal and iron 
companies for 1860-1914 in Pitts 1998b. 
8.2 Dividends and depreciation policies employed 1850-1930 
Before 1890 most of the sample companies distributed about half of their operating 
profit before any charge for depreciation - so dividends could vary greatly from one 
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year to the next and be imprudent in poor years. The few exceptions are interesting: 
Carron Iron paid a constant dividend (yielding 15% on the paid up share capital) plus a 
"bonus" in good years and Cannock Chase was entirely funded by `redeemable 
preference shares' at incorporation in 1859. The first shares were to yield 14% of the 
paid up value until 1885 when they were to be considered repaid, and the share capital 
was diminished by £80,000 in this period. The company appears to have been seen by 
the original Directors as a venture with a finite life as the dividend explicitly repaid the 
capital. Both were private companies and shares were not available to the public. 
A minority of coal companies practiced 'replacement accounting' pioneered by the 
railways, keeping the initial value of their fixed assets constant and writing all repairs 
and improvements to the Profit and Loss account, with disclosure (Consett) or without 
(Guest, Keen and Nettlefold). Most charged depreciation as a percentage of asset cost, 
based on either the life of the lease or the size of the coal deposit (Bolckow Vaughan, 
Wigan, Staveley and others). In poor years depreciation was omitted or charged to 
reserves and in good years large fixed asset investments were charged to the revenue 
account so profits were smoothed. Disclosure of depreciation varied from company to 
company and with time, but directors did understand the need for it (Pitts 1998b). 
After 1890 most of the sample coal companies continued to pay dividends varying 
with profits but a totally different dividend policy developed in this period: a growing 
trend to pay a constant dividend (expressed in the financial press as a fixed percentage 
yield on the paid up share capital and not on the market price of the share). The first 
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coal companies to do this were Guest Keen and Nettlefold and Carron. This policy 
spread to other coal companies from 1914 (Supple 1987 p. 394) and was adopted by 
many other industrial and commercial sectors in Britain and the USA by the 1930s. 
The `stable rate of dividend on the capital' policy persisted well into this century (up 
to 1950) and was applied in a wide selection of industries: 
`Many famous American and British companies have treated their ordinary 
shares as though they were preference shares or debentures, to be paid a fixed 
income ... and the Bank of England, before it was nationalised, paid its 
shareholders 9% for the ten successive years 1904 to 1913 and 10% for the 
seven years from 1914-15 to 1920-21. This policy is sometimes spoken of as 
"institutionalising" a company. ' Florence (1961 p. 148). 
This indicates a further change in the general perception of the nature of the 
property rights of the original owners: not only profits but dividends were 
smoothed to satisfy shareholders, now seen as mere passive receivers of dividends, 
rather than sleeping partners. The policy of paying constant dividends was an 
intermediate policy to the dividend policy which seems to be prevalent today. The 
current model determines dividends as a smoothed proportion of current earnings 
and last year's dividend; a form of dynamics, proposed by Lintner in 1956 in his 
partial adjustment model. However, this behaviour is also consistent with other 
prior hypotheses, such as the `adaptive expectations' model (Nerlove 1958) or the 
`distributive lag' model (Koyck 1954), so the precise behavioural implications are 
unclear although the fact that some form of dividend smoothing is taking place is 
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not in doubt. Shareholders ceased to be viewed as partners, even sleeping ones, by 
company directors at least a century ago. 
Modem finance is much concerned about the tax implications of dividend policy as 
there may be an element of double taxation in taxing both company profits and 
distributions made from these profits (Brealey and Myers 2000 p. 455-462). Rates 
of income tax before 1914 were very low. The highest rate in the pound between 
1860 and 1914 was 1/4d (6.6%) and this was only charged during periods of war - 
the Crimea, the Boer War. Usually it was half this rate or even lower (Mitchell and 
Deane 1976 p. 429). Income tax did not affect dividend policy before 1914. 
However capital taxes, such as Stamp Duty, were material to company decisions 
(Pitts 2000) as is outlined in the next section. 
8.3 The effect of taxation on company financial practices and company law 
The twentieth century appearance of the share premium account in Initial Public 
Offerings indicated a change in the nature of the account: formerly share premiums 
were considered to be a contribution by new investors to the retained profits of 
previous generations of investors and only appeared in secondary offerings. 
However, in IPOs the share premium is part of the issued share capital. Once 
recognised as such, the share premium should logically have been restricted to the 
same uses as the nominal value of the shares but was not (CA 1948, s. 56 and Noke 
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1981). 
The change was the result of a tax loophole, open from 1899, but not exploited until 
the capital duty rate had risen to 1% in 1920. The loophole was closed in 1973, 
more than 50 years later, but the custom of issuing shares of low nominal value at a 
high premium has persisted in the U. K. right up to the present day. Pitts 2000 
appears to be the only paper to explain this format and extends the work of Jefferys 
1938 and Cottrell 1980 beyond 1914. The anomalies of this situation has led to 
repeated attempts by UK governments to introduce no par value shares, so far to no 
avail (Pitts 2000), although it has been achieved in Australia (Company Law 
Review Act 1998 s. 254). This is one example of the unpredictable consequences 
of tax legislation on the financing strategy and reporting standards of commercial 
enterprise. 
8.4 The influence of individuals 
Two of the papers are much concerned with individuals: Pitts 2001 and Pitts 
1998a. The latter records an individual dominating director (Joseph Pease) whose 
conduct was legally challenged and found to be inequitable. Corporate governance 
has been the subject of much government enquiry and recent legislation (see 
section 2.4). Modem company legislation has still not solved the problem of 
controlling a powerful individual director (Kay and Silbertson 1995, Napier 1999). 
The emphasis in the legislation is still on empowering the shareholder: more 
disclosure and more shareholder participation in decisions such as directors' 
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remuneration. History shows that problems existed even when the directors and 
shareholders were one and the same. 
As far as professional advice was concerned, it should be remembered that the 
accountancy profession was in its infancy in 1862. Speaking of cost accounting 
before 1850: 
The absence of an accounting profession, an accounting literature ... or a 
costing tradition emanating from accountants or bookkeepers was pronounced 
and deafening in its silence. Instead, the attribution of innovation and 
development in approaches to industrial cost managers must go to the then 
owners and managers of the firms themselves. It was they who developed and 
utilised their own systems ... in an ongoing pursuit of cost efficiency and 
competitive advantage. (Fleischmann and Parker 1997 p. 286) 
The first book on audit was published in 1881 (Pixley) and on depreciation in 1893 
(Matheson). In the absence of statute law and any professional guidelines some 
individuals had a powerful effect on the economic and financial decisions and 
policies of the new companies and many of these are in the Dictionary of Business 
Biography (Section 1.4.3). 
The other powerful individual discussed (in Pitts 2001) was William Armstrong. 
He was an engineer and a prototype management consultant with clear ideas about 
capital and income and the amortization of wasting assets. He explained them in 
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several of his reports to directors. In his report to the Consett directors he pointed 
out that profits declared on wasting assets (short leases on mines) without provision 
for depreciation was unfair and misleading to future investors. His emphasis on 
future investors was ahead of his time; Victorian legislators assumed that the 
current `members' of a company would be able to ask enough searching questions 
of the directors not to be misled and made no provision to protect potential 
investors from misstatements in the published accounts or in prospectuses. 
Another issue which is still relevant and was discussed by Armstrong is transfer 
pricing: Bolckow Vaughan wished to partition their profits between coal and iron. 
Armstrong's 1867 report analyses the reasons for implementing a transfer pricing 
policy and the various methods which could be adopted with clarity and style. He 
anticipates the conclusions reported a century later by Hirschleifer and others 
(Kaplan 1984 p. 402-3) and demonstrates that the `scientific management era of 
cost accounting (1895-1915)' began in Britain at least 25 years earlier. 
In the interest of truth and fairness, the technique of valuing real assets by 
discounting net cash flows at risk-adjusted discount rates should have its history 
restored. Modern finance text books attribute the technique to Irving Fisher (1930). 
He made no claim to the origins of his ideas, attributing much of his work to John 
Rae (1834), although discounted cash flows do not feature in Rae's text. The DCF 
technique for valuing real assets was in use centuries earlier than 1930 (Miller and 
Napier 1993, Scorgie 1986, Parker 1968). These papers record its use in land and 
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timber valuation in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Armstrong's advice was 
privately commissioned and not generally available but his many clients understood 
his reports and acted on them. He was not the first: there were others with equal 
insight among the engineers and viewers of the eighteenth century (Brackenbury, 
McLean and Oldroyd 2000). It may be another example of 
`The aid which economic science has given towards understanding the part 
played by capital in our industrial system is solid and substantial; but it has made 
no startling discoveries. Everything of importance which is now known to 
economists has long been acted upon by able business men, though they may not 
have been able to express their knowledge clearly or even accurately. ' 
(Marshall 1922, quoted in Williams 1938) 
8.5 Finale 
The `received wisdom' on the accounts of Victorian entrepreneurs is that these are `at 
best ambiguous and at worst unreliable' (Brief 1990 p. 24) and that company 
promoters and directors took advantage of the laissez-faire attitude of Parliament to 
deceive and mislead investors and shareholders. Much of the literature reviewing the 
accounting practices of this period has been written by historians and economists, who 
are not fully conversant with the conventions and restrictions of accounting practice at 
that time (or indeed the present). Later generations have drawn their conclusions from 
the existing body of secondary literature. 
Inspection of primary documents suggests a different picture; the businessmen of the 
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nineteenth century were as intelligent as their successors and made good use of the 
economic opportunities available. Some of these opportunities may have arisen from 
poorly drafted tax regulations (Stamp Duty, discussed in Pitts 2000) or in the lack of 
governance controls leading to poorly informed shareholders (Pitts 1998a, 1998b). 
Similar opportunities are open to modern directors and recent history (Maxwell, 
Barings, BCCI) indicates that controls imposed since 1948 are no more effective. 
The papers forming this collection add to the history of business and accounting 
development from partnerships to modern public limited companies, in the economic, 
legal and financial framework of 1850-1950. 
The financial records collected for the ESRC project ended in 1914. The coal industry 
suffered many changes of fortune in the years that followed: the war years 1914-1919 
and 1939-1945 with great domestic demand, a much reduced labour force and 
government controls, contrasted with the interwar years 1919-1939 where the loss of 
the export market led to chronic domestic oversupply and falling prices (Supple 1987 
p. 3-15). Directors of coal companies were criticised by politicians and the press for 
their failure to adapt to the changing market after 1920 and for the consequent 
unemployment and low wages suffered by their workforce. Many of these directors 
were the same men who had managed the coal companies in their period of prosperity 
before 1914. There is a need for more research at company level to evaluate both the 
entrepreneurial performance of British industry over a longer period and the effects of 
government intervention. The data collected for the original ESRC project 
(000234513) is being extended to nationalisation and beyond, as the compensation 
took years to negotiate, by the author. 
8.11 

Bibliography 
A. G. v. Tube Investments (1930). 142 LT: 561-6, London. 
Arnold, A. J., (1995), `Should Historians Trust Late Nineteenth-Century Company 
Financial Statements? ', Business History, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 40-54 
Arnold, A. J., (1997), "Publishing your private affairs to the world': corporate 
financial disclosures in the UK 1900-24', Accounting Business and Financial 
History, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 143-173 
Baldwin, T. J. and Berry, RH., (1999), `The measurement of nineteenth century 
accounting error: cases from the British coal industry 1864-1900', Accounting 
History, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 79-98 
Baldwin, T. J., (1994), `Management Aspiration and Audit Opinion : Fixed Asset 
Accounting at the Staveley Coal and Iron Company', Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 25, No. 97, pp. 3-12 
Baldwin, T. J., Berry, RH. and Church, RA., (1992), `The Accounts of the Consett 
Iron Company 1864-1914', Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 22, No. 86, 
pp. 99-109 
Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
Macmillan, New York 
Boyns, T., (1986) Growth in the Coal Industry: the Cases of Powell Duffryn and 
the Ocean Coal Company, 1863-1913, published in Modern South Wales: Essays in 
Economic History, ed. Baber, C. and Williams, L. J., University of Wales Press, 
Cardiff 
Boyns, T. and Edwards, J. R. E., (1995), `Accounting Systems and Decision-Making 
in the Mid-Victorian period; The Case of the Consett Iron Company', Business 
History, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 28-51 
Boyns, T. and Edwards, J. RE., (1997a), `The Construction of Cost Accounting 
Systems in Britain to 1900: The Case of the Coal, Iron and Steel Industries', 
Business History Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 1-29 
Boyns, T. and Edwards, J. R. E., (1997b), `British Cost and Management accounting 
theory and practice, c. 1850-c. 1950; resolved and unresolved issues, Business and 
Economic History Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 452-462 
Boyns, T., Edwards, J. R. and Emmanuel, C., (1999), `A longitudinal study of the 
determinant of transfer pricing change', Management Accounting Research, Vol. 
10, pp. 85-108 
Brackenbury S., McLean T. and Oldroyd, D., (2001) `The emergence of discounted 
cash flow analysis in the Tyneside coal industry c. 1700-1825', British Accounting 
Review Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 137-155 
Brealey, R. A. and Myers, S. C., (2000), Principles of Corporate Finance, Irwin 
McGraw-Hill, New York 
Brief RP., (1965), `Nineteenth Century Accounting error', Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 3, pp. 12-3 1, reprinted in The Continuing Debate over 
Depreciation, Capital and Income, ed. Brief, R. P., Garland Publishing Inc., New 
York and London 
Brief, R., (1966), `The Origin and Evolution of Nineteenth-Century Asset 
Accounting' The Business History Review XL, 1 pp. 1-23, reprinted in The 
Continuing Debate over Depreciation, Capital and Income, ed. Brief, RP., Garland 
Publishing Inc., New York and London 
Brief, RP., (1990), `Accounting Error as a Factor in Business History', The 
Journal of Accounting Research, October 1990, pp. 1-21, reprinted in The 
Continuing Debate over Depreciation, Capital and Income, ed. Brief, RP., Garland 
Publishing Inc., New York and London 
Bryer, RA., (1993), `The Late Nineteenth Century Revolution in Financial 
Reporting: Accounting for Investor or Managerial Capitalism? ', Accounting, 
Organisations and Society Vol. 18, No. 7/8, pp. 649-90 
Bryer, R., (1997), `The Mercantile Laws Commission of 1854 and the Political 
Economy of Limited Liability' Economic History Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 37-56 
Bryer, RA., (1998), `The Laws of Accounting in late nineteenth Century Britain', 
Accounting History, NS Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 55-94. 
Campbell RH., (1961), Carron Company, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh. 
Campbell RH., (1967), The Law and the Joint-Stock Company in Scotland, in 
Studies in Scottish Business History, ed. Payne, P. L., Frank Cass, London 
Carlyon Estate Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1937). TC 46, pp. 413-7, 
London 
Chadwick David, (1870-1875), Chadwicks' Investment Circular, ref. WP 1424asb 
British Museum Library, London 
Chandler, A., (1976), `The Development of Modem Management Structure in the 
US and UK', in Management Strategy and Business Development: An Historical 
and Comparative Study, ed. Hannah, L., Macmillan, London 
Chapman, S. D., (1981), Stanton and Staveley A Business History, Woodhead 
Faulkner, Cambridge 
Christie, A. and Shaw, C. (1984), `DALE Sir David', Dictionary of Business 
Biography ed. Jeremy D. J., Butterworths and London School of Economics 
Business History Unit, London 
Church, R., (1992), `The Family Firm in Industrial Capitalism: International 
Perspectives on Hypotheses and History', Business History Vol. 35(4), pp. 17-43 
2 
Church, R., Baldwin, T. and Berry, R., (1994), `Accounting for Profitability at the 
Consett Iron Company before 1914: measurement, sources and uses', Economic 
History Review Vol. XLVII, No. 4, pp. 703-724 
Church, R. A., (1986), The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 31860- 
1913 : Victorian Pre-eminence, O. U. P., Oxford 
Cottrell, P. L., (1980), Industrial Finance 1830-1914 The Finance and 
Organisation of English Manufacturing Industry, Methuen, London 
Cottrell, P. L., (1984), `David Chadwick' in Dictionary of Business Biography A-C: 
625-633, ed. Jeremy D. J., Butterworth, and London School of Economics Business 
History Unit, London 
Drown v Gaumont-British Picture Corporation Ltd (1937), 2 All ER 609 
Durham Record Office NCB 1/X 105,168 and D/Pe/3/53, Pease and Partners 1873- 
1918 
Edelstein, M., (1976), `Realized Rates of Return on U. K. Home and Overseas 
Portfolio Investment in the Age of High Imperialism' Explorations it) Economic 
History Vol. 13, pp. 283-329 
Edelstein, M., (1971), `Rigidity and bias in the British capital market 1870-1913', in 
Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840, D. N. McCloskey (ed. ), Methuen, 
London 
Edwards, J. R., (1981), Company Legislation and Changing Patterns of Disclosure 
in British Company Accounts 1900-1940, ICAEW, London 
Edwards, J. R., (1989), A History of Financial Accounting, Routledge, London 
Edwards, J. R. and Webb, K. M., (1985), `Use of Table A by Companies registering 
Under the Companies Act 1862', Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 15, 
Summer, pp. 177-195 
Edwards, J. R., (1980), `British Capital Accounting Practices and Business Finance 
1852-1919 An Exemplification', Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 10, 
Spring, pp. 241-258 
Edwards, J. R. and Boyns, T., (1994), `Accounting Practice and Business Finance: 
Some Case Studies from the Iron and Coal Industry 1865-1914', Journal of 
Business, Finance andAccounting, Vol. 21, No. 8, pp. 1151-78 
Edwards, J. R. and Warman, A., (1981), `Discounted Cash Flow and Business 
Valuation in a Nineteenth Century Merger: A Note', The Accounting Historians 
Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2. pp. 37-50 
Edwards, R. S., (1939), `A Note on the Law relating to Company Dividends', 
Economics, Vol. VI, May, pp. 170-190 
Evans, G. H., (1936), British Corporation Finance 177.5-1850 A Study of 
Preference Shares, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, USA 
Extel, (1987,1988,1994). Record of Takeovers, Offers and New Issues, London 
Fischer, D. H., (1996), The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of 
History, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Fisher, I., (1906), The Nature of Capital and Income, reprinted 1965, Augustus M 
Kelley, New York 
Fisher, I., (1930), The Theory of Interest, reprinted 1965, Augustus M Kelley, New 
York 
Fleishman, R. K. and Parker, L. D., (1990), `Managerial Accounting Early in the 
British Industrial Revolution: The Carron Company, a Case Study', Accounting and 
Business Research, Vol. 20, No. 79, pp. 211-221 
Fleishman, R. K. and Parker, L. D., (1997), What is Past is Prologue: Cost 
Accounting in the British Industrial Revolution 1760-1850, Garland Publishing Inc. 
New York and London. 
Florence, P. Sargant, (1961), Ownership, Control and Success of Large Companies: 
An analysis of English industrial structure and policy 1936-1951, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 
French, E. A., (1977), The Evolution of the Dividend Law of England in Studies in 
Accounting ed. Baxter W. T. and Davidson S., ICAEW, London 
Garnsey G. L., (1931), Holding Companies and their Published Accounts, Gee, 
London, reprinted Garland Publishing Inc. (1982), New York and London 
Halsbury, H. S. G., Earl of, (1954), Halsbury's Laws of England, Ed. 3,6, 
Butterworth, London 
Heaton, J. and Lucas, D., (2000), Portfolio choice and asset prices: the importance 
of entrepreneurial risk, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 pp. 1163-1198 
Henry Head & Co. Ltd v. Ropner Holdings Ltd (1952). 1 Ch. p. 124, London 
High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, December 1900, before Farwell J. In re 
Edward Pease (Deceased): The Earl of Portsmouth v Pease: Judgment reported in 
The North Star December 12 1900 
Hilder v Dexter (1902). AC p. 474 (House of Lords), London 
Jefferys, J. B., (1946), `The Denomination and Character of Shares 1855-1885', The 
Economic History Review, Vol. XVI, pp. 45-55 
Jefferys, J. B., (1938), Trends in business organisation in Great Britain since 1856 
with special reference to the financial structure of companies, the mechanism of 
investment and the relations between shareholder and the company, London 
University: unpublished Ph. D. thesis 
Jensen, M. C., (1986), `Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers' American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings Vol. 76, No. 
2, pp. 323-329 
4 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H., (1976), `Theory of the Firm : Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics 
Vol. 3, pp. 305-360 
Jevons, H. S., (1920), The British Coal Trade, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 
Ltd., London 
Jones, E., (1987), A history of GKN. - Vol. 1: Innovation and enterprise 1759- 
1918, Macmillan, London 
Jones, S. and Aiken, M., (1994), `The Significance of the Profit and Loss Account in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain: A Reassessment', Abacus Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 196-229 
Kaplan, R. S., (1984), `The evolution of management accounting', Accounting 
Review Vol. 59, pp. 390-418 
Kay, J. and Silbertson, A., (1995), `Corporate Governance', National Institute 
Economic Council, August, pp. 84-97 
Kennedy, W. P., (1987), Industrial Structure, Capital Markets and the Origins of 
British Economic decline, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Kirby, M. W., (1977), The British CoalminingIndustry 18 70-1946 A Political and 
Economic History, Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Archon Press, Connecticut, 
USA 
Kirby, M. W., (1984), Men of Business and Politics: The Rise and Fall of the 
Quaker Pease Dynasty of North-East England, 1700-1943, George Allen & Unwin, 
London 
Koyck, L. M., (1954), Distributive Lag and Investment Analysis, North Holland 
Publishing House, Amsterdam 
Kynaston, D. T. A., (1983), The London Stock Exchange, 1870-1914, An 
Institutional History, London School of Economics and Political Science 
(unpublished Ph. D. thesis) 
Lamb, M. A., (1997), `Tax practice in the United Kingdom and the emergence of 
interrelationships between accounting and the taxation of business profits' Reading 
University, (unpublished Ph. D. thesis) 
Lavington, F., (1921) The English Capital Market, Methuen, London 
Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte Co. (1899), 41 Ch. D. 1 
Linsley Stafford, M., (1984), `ARMSTRONG, William George', Dictionary of 
Business Biography ed. Jeremy D. J., London: Butterworths and London School of 
Economics Business History Unit 
Lintner, J., (1956), `Distribution of incomes of Corporations among Dividends, 
Retained Earnings, and Taxes', American Economic Review, Vol. XLVI, May, pp. 
97-113 
5 
Lowenfeld, H., (1909), All about Investment, Financial Review of Reviews, 
London 
Maltby, J. (1998), 'UK Joint Stock Companies Legislation 1844-1900: Accounting 
Publicity and Mercantile Caution', Accounting History NS Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 9-32 
Maltby, J. (2000), `Was the Companies Act 1947 a response to a national crisis? ', 
Accounting History NS Vol. 5, No. 2 pp. 31-60 
Marriner, Sheila, (1980), `Company Financial Statements as Source Material for 
Business H'istorians', Business History XXII, pp. 203-235 
Matheson, Ewing, (1893), The Depreciation of Factories, Mines and liulustrial 
Undertakings and their Valuation, reprinted 1976, Arno Press Inc., USA 
Mathias, P., (1983), The first industrial nation : an economic history of Britain 
1700 - 1914. Routledge, London 
Miller, M. H. and Modigliani F., (1961), `Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation 
of Shares', Journal of Business, October, pp. 411-433 
Miller, P. B. and Napier, C. J., (1993), `Genealogies of Calculation', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 18, No. 7/8, pp. 631-647 
Mitchell, B. R., (1984), Economic development of the British coal industry 1800 - 
1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Mitchell, B. R. and Deane, P., (1962), Abstract of British Historical Statistics, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Morris, RD., (1986), `Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1889) and 
Depreciation Accounting: Two Empirical Studies', Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 17, Winter, pp. 71-81 
Napier C. J., (1999), ` "Those who do not learn from History... ": Robert Maxwell 
and the British Accounting Crisis of 1969', Paper presented at The First 
Accounting History International Conference, Melbourne 
Napier C. J., (1990), `Fixed Asset Accounting in the Shipping Industry: P&O 1840- 
1914', Accounting Business and Financial History Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 23-50 
Napier, C. J., (1991), `Secret Accounting: The P&O Group in the Inter-War Years', 
Accounting Business and Financial History, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 303-333 
Napier, C. J. and Noke, C., (1992), `Accounting and law : An historical overview of 
an uneasy relationship' in Accounting and the Law, ed. Bromwich, M., Prentice Hall 
in association with ICAEW 
Napier, C. J. and Noke, C., (1991), `Premiums and Pre-Acquisition Profits: The 
Legal and Accountancy Professions and Business Combination', The Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 54, No. 6 
Nerlove, M., (1958), `Distributed Lags and Demand Analysis' USDA Handbook 
141, Washington, USA 
6 
Nikitin, M., (1992), `La naissance de la comptabilite industrielle en France', 
Universite de Paris Dauphine (unpublished Ph. D. thesis) 
Noke, C., (1981), `Why not distribute share premiums? ', Accountancy Vol. 92, 
April, pp. 43-46 
Noke, C., (2000), `No value in par: a history of the no par value debate in the 
United Kingdom' Accounting Business and Financial History, Vol. 10, No. 1, 
pp. 13-36 
NRO: Northumberland Record Office Armstrong 725 B 1-20, Report Books 1842- 
1943 
NRO: Northumberland Record Office Armstrong 725 C54 1-4 W. G. (sic) 
Armstrong's reports, valuations, plans and correspondence relating mainly to 
mining enterprises in County Durham 
Nuffield College Library Pease Papers MS Gainford 26 
Parker, RH., (1968), `Discounted cash flow in historical perspective', Journal of 
Accounting Research Autumn, pp. 58-71 
Parker, RH., (1990), `Regulating British corporate financial reporting in the late 
nineteenth century', Accounting Business and Financial History, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Company Law Review Act 1998, 
Canberra 
Payne, P. L., (1967), `The Emergence of the Large Scale Company in Great Britain 
1870-1914', Economic History Review, Vol. XX, pp. 519-539 
Payne, P. L., (1984), `Family Business in Britain: An Historical and Analytic Survey', 
in Akis Okochi and Shigeaki Yasuoka (eds. ), Family Business in Eras of Industrial 
Growth, Tokyo 
Picken, C. H. (1905), Handbook to Stamp Duties containing the text of the Stamp 
Act 1891 and of the subsequent Revenue Acts so far as they relate to Stamp Duties 
with a Complete Alphabetical Table of all Documents liable to Stamp Duty by H. S. 
Bond, Late of the Solicitors' Department, Inland Revenue, Somerset House, 
Waterlow and Sons Ltd., London 
Pixley, F. W., (1881), Auditors, Their Duties and Responsibilities, (ed. 1), Henry 
Good and Son, London 
Purdy D. E., (1983), `Let's put an end to par values' Accountancy Vol. 94, January, 
pp. 121-3 
Rae, John, (1834), Statement of some New Principles of Political Economy, 
reprinted 1964, Augustus M. Kelley, New York 
Re Hoare & Co, Limited and Reduced (1904). 2 Ch. 208: 211 
Re Thorn FJ'fl plc (1988). 4 BCC 698 (Ch D) 
7 
Reid, J. M., (1987), `Law and Accounting Pre-1889 British Legal Cases, Garland 
Publishing Inc., New York and London 
Ritchie, L. A., (1992), The Shipbuilding Industry :a guide to historical records, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester 
Scorgie, M. E., (1996), `Evolution of the Application of Present Value to Valuation 
of Non-monetary Resources', Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 26, No. 3, 
pp. 237-248 
Shannon, H. A., (1932a), `The first 5000 Limited Companies and their Duration', 
Economic History, Vol. II, pp. 396-374 
Shannon, H. A., (1932b), `The Coming of General Limited Liability', Economic 
History, Vol. II, pp. 267-291 
Shannon, H. A., (1933), `The Limited Companies of 1866-1883', Economic History 
Review, Vol. 4, pp. 290-3 07 
Stopforth, D., (1992), `1922-36: Halcyon Days for the Tax Avoider' British Tax 
Review, Vol. 2, pp. 88-105 
Supple, B., (1987), The History of the British Coal Industry, 4: The Political 
Economy of Decline, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Taylor, A. J., (1980), `The Coal Industry' in Dynamics of Victorian Business: 
Problems and Perspectives to the 1870s ed. R. Church, George Allen and Unwin, 
London 
The Economist, (1865-1914), Weekly Share Prices, Iron, Coal and Steel 
Thomas, W. A., (1973), The Provincial Stock Exchanges, Frank Cass, London 
Todd, G., (1939), `Some aspects of Joint-Stock Companies 1844-1900', Economic 
History Review, Vol. 4, pp. 46-71 
Toms, J. S., (1998) The Supply and Demand for Accounting Information in an 
Unregulated Market, Accounting. Organizations and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
pp. 217-238 
Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers, (1897-8), Vol. XIV, 
pp. 171-173 
Tsumori, T., (1995), `Development of a "Philosophy of Disclosure" in Accounting 
Institutions of Japan' in Studies in Accounting History ed. A. Tsuji and P. Garner, 
Greenwood Press, London and Westport Connecticut 
Wale, J., (1990), `The Reliability of Reported Profits and Asset Values 1890-1914: 
Case Studies from the British Coal Industry', Accounting and Business Research, 
Vol. 20, pp. 253-267 
Walter, R. H., (1977) The economic and business history of the South Wales steam 
coal industry 1840-1914, Arno, New York 
Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. L., (1979) `The Demand for and Supply of 
Accounting Theories: The Market for Excuses', The Accounting Review, Vol. LIV, 
No. 2, pp. 273-305 
Williams, J. B. (1938), The Theory of Investment Value, reprinted 1964, North- 
Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 
Wilson, Charles, (1984), 'BELL, Sir Isaac Lowthian, Dictionary of Business 
Biography ed. Jeremy D. J., Butterworths and London School of Economics 
Business History Unit, London 
Yamey, B. S., (1941) `Aspects of the Law Relating to Company Dividends', The 
Modem Law Review, Vol. 4, April, pp. 273-298 
Yamey, B. S., (1962), `The Case Law relating to Company Dividends' Studies in 
Accounting Theory, ed. Baxter, W. T. and Davidson, S., Sweet and Maxwell, London 
